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A FINAL LETTER 
Allan C Hutchinson1 and Derek Morgan2 
What a generous invitation! I am delighted to make a small contribution to 
your symposium. Although I am not as strong or fervent as I once was (and, 
if truth be told, spend a large part of my energy simply ‘raging against the 
dying light’). I welcome the opportunity to share some of my modest 
thoughts on the related events and developments in the law of torts 
generally and accident compensation more specifically of the last quarter 
century.  
Having glanced through the Derek case in the past weeks and annotating it, 
I returned to re-read the whole – though not in the order in which the 
judgment was originally drafted and written – on Saturday morning in a 
more salubrious cafe some mere seven miles removed from Francis 
Minchella’s cafe where the facts of May Donoghue’s now notorious case are 
alleged to have occurred. It took about an hour to read and to annotate 
sketchily. It reminded me, as it were, that while art may be short, work is 
long, but that that work is the art of selection as much as of reflection.  We 
judges are engaged in the construction of hard cases and borderline cases, 
we make them in the way we select and recount salient facts; review and 
discount ‘applicable’ norms; and then weave our own legal threads into the 
garment that we have designed  
What did I find there? Three questions, at least; two assumptions, four 
typos, and one, maybe two, possible mistakes. And, of course, a number of 
reflections and reservations were prompted. 
First, it is hard to believe that twenty-five years have passed since the 
judgment  in the rather run-of-the-mill Derek and Charles v. Anne and 
Martin. We are all older, but if my own experience is anything to go by, not 
necessarily any the wiser. Although I have sought to resist the fall-back 
temptation of the older author, it does seem to me that the truth of Jean-
Baptiste Kar’s epigram plus ca change, c’est plus ca meme remains more 
telling than ever. There has been a lot of ‘chatter’ (judicial and academic), 
but very little action for the better when it comes to tort law.  We are 
1 Distinguished Research Professor, Osgoode Hall School of Law, Osgoode Hall University. 
2 Sometime Professor of Law, The University of Sheffield, and Editor, The Journal of 
Professional Negligence. 
HUTCHINSON AND MORGAN ON A FINAL LETTER 
(2010) J. JURIS 336
running on the spot, utilising much intellectual effort, but getting nowhere 
fast. It is not a very edifying condition.  
However, I am both delighted and despondent with the knowledge that this 
judgment   of the Canengus Supreme Court has achieved such notoriety that 
it warrants recollection and even celebration so many years later. The fact 
that it is used as both fodder for the academic mill and as a teaching tool for 
young lawyers is both a blight and a blessing. I am genuinely flattered that 
people think it retains a certain relevance and can still open up readers’ eyes 
to the problems and plights of tort law and common law adjudication 
generally. However, its continued usage confirms to me that we have not 
really come very far in the intervening years and made much of a success of 
addressing, let alone resolving,  the problems that pervade both enterprises.  
With that said, what can I offer? Having read and re-read that case and the 
contributions of my colleagues, I was more than slightly embarrassed by the 
rather self-righteous and almost  sanctimonious tone of my own 
contribution. It would seem that I had a very high opinion of my own 
importance and clearly thought that I was making a grand gesture that would 
stir my colleagues, myself and the rest of the legal world to make some 
significant changes in what they did. This, of course, was a pious hope. 
Nevertheless, although suitably chastened by age and further experience, I 
still hold to much of what I said in my judgment. I might have expressed it 
in less alienating and slightly more accommodating terms, but I think that 
my fit of pique likely served some purpose, if only as an outlet for my own 
sense of disillusionment and felt need to do something.  Since then, I have 
sought in my writings and public actions to remain true to that commitment 
to making the world and its legal community a better place. That I have not 
done close to enough or had sufficient impact is something that I have to 
live with.  
Even though a quarter century has passed, how little has changed. The 
ghosts of poverty are ever-present. Nearly half of all human beings presently 
live in severe poverty; many of them fall far below that threshold: people of 
colour, women and the very young are heavily over-represented among the 
global poor. Almost a billion people are chronically under-nourished and 
lack access to safe water; more than two billion cannot rely on basic 
sanitation and essential medicines are out of their reach. Illiteracy is rampant 
and children are obliged to work as soldiers, prostitutes, or domestic 
servants. These circumstances are depressing and are getting worse, not 
better.  
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What is equally depressing is that extreme forms of poverty exist not only in 
the Third World, but  also in so-called ‘advanced’ and wealthy societies like 
Canengus and other similar societies. Nearly one in ten Canengusians 
experienced conditions of ‘absolute poverty’ without basic human necessities 
such as enough food, safe drinking water and proper sanitation. And a 
similar number live in conditions of relative poverty and deprivation; it is the 
old, the young, and single parents who carry the heaviest burdens. The gap 
between the haves and the have-nots continues to grow wider. This is an 
affront to all decency and an insult to humanity.   
I still tend to agree with what John Maynard Keynes (now slightly back in 
favour after being intellectually exiled by the Chicagoan marketeers) said 
almost 100 years ago that “we assume some of the most peculiar and 
temporary of our late advantages as natural, permanent, and to be depended 
on, and we lay our plans accordingly.” Moreover, “on this sandy and false 
foundation we scheme for social improvement and dress our political 
platforms, pursue our animosities and particular ambitions.” Lawyers, judges 
and jurists do not seem to appreciate (or simply refuse to accept) that the 
judgments and processes in the Derek case have built on the same sandy and 
false foundations. We continue to contribute to that state of affairs if we 
proceed with mere hand-wringing at these unpardonable facts. It may be 
that prevailing economic regimes need the poor, but moral communities do 
not. As stark as it seems, the legal community is contributing to perpetuating 
this travesty as long as it fails to do something significant and sustained to 
change things.  
Many will find this implied vision of the judges as moral and political 
activists to be very much beyond the pale. I obviously do not. The voice of 
the judiciary is moral and political whether it likes it or not. The only choice 
is about what morality and whose interests it wants to serve. There is no 
place of neutrality or indifference to stand. Like other political actors, the 
judges have a singular responsibility to forge a moral identity that is worthy 
of their power and influence. To do otherwise, as many of my colleagues did 
in Derek, is to institutionalize Hannah Arendt’s notion of the ‘banalization 
of suffering’. It is the privileged position that courts claim in our system of 
governance that behoves them to assume this crucial role and hold 
communities up to a better vision of themselves. There can be no more 
noble or fitting ambition than to defend and promote the values of a 
common humanity. This applies in the doctrinal details of tort doctrine as 
much as it does in the grander issues of constitutional politics.  
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When courts engage in the arena of moral politics, as they must, the 
questions of boundaries become important; there is a prima facie 
understandable caution in straying from the High Court to the High Court 
of Parliament and into the High Street. The currencies of legitimacy and 
credibility mean that judges cannot afford to be thought of as toxic assets on 
the ideological balance-sheet of democratic politics. However, the Canengus 
judiciary seems to have frittered away much of its political capital by 
granting a much higher credit-rating to the courts in the new moral economy 
of rights-based adjudication. Like so many other countries, Canengus has 
adopted a Bill of Rights with all its attendant institutional paraphernalia. 
That some judges have invested this new capital more keenly or rashly than 
others should be no surprise; there have always been ‘brave souls’ and 
‘timorous spirits’. But even the most bold of judicial spirits has refused to 
utilise their dubious powers to greet the moral clarion-call of poverty’s 
eradication. If they are to have any chance of gaining the support of their 
citizens, they must act to enhance the welfare, in its broadest sense, of all 
those who are presently disempowered and disenfranchised (except in the 
most formal terms). Judges can only help to make politics safe for 
democracy by instantiating the kind of civic dialogue and action that is 
needed. Any other way of proceeding is a betrayal of themselves and the 
society that they represent. Judges need to reconfigure law so that it 
sharpens, not dulls the ‘conscience’ of society, a task I set out to accomplish 
in my judgment in Derek but lacked, as I now see, the moral will to 
complete, choosing instead to resign my commission and abandon my 
responsibility to the wider social interests that I was trying to articulate.     
As for academic lawyers, I offer my comments and suggestions with even 
greater hesitation. I have followed the agonies of legal scholarship from the 
relative sidelines in the past few decades. The American professor, Bruce 
Ackerman, famously noted that “philosophy decides cases and hard 
philosophy at that.” This strikes me as both a challenging insight and also a 
dangerous distraction. It seems to me absolutely correct that it is impossible 
to resolve difficult cases without some resort to a broader set of principles 
and values; the idea that judges can get by without appreciating the broader 
theoretical context in which a case or legal doctrine falls is badly mistaken. 
The only choice is whether you are to have a genuine and defensible 
knowledge of what your animating theory is or not. Any craft worth its 
name has to be guided by some more general vision or ambition of social 
justice. As that quotable jurist, Karl Llewellyn, opined “technique without 
ideals is a menace; ideals without technique are a mess.” And, I would add, 
that they are not simply a mess, but also a menace. But, even though a resort 
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to hard philosophy is inevitable it also self- deluding to think that such 
theories can relieve judges of the painful burden of choosing. At best, 
philosophical theories can provide an important context or orientation with 
which they can frame and answer the problems that cases throw up at them. 
What they cannot do is to lead from abstract elucidation to practical 
resolution in one fell swoop. As another American, the inimitable Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., said, “general propositions do not decide concrete 
cases.” There are many staging-posts from reflection to decision and so 
many variables to consider. It is little more than a sleight of the hand to 
propose or pretend that ‘philosophy decides case’ of its own exclusive and 
unaided motion. Judges must be philosophers, but they must also be 
practical men and women of the world. Like all other realms of human 
interaction, philosophy is one more venue where vested interests, special 
affiliations and other local enthusiasms are given universal clothing. Law 
does not need dogma, philosophical or otherwise, but a more pragmatic 
sensibility and hands-on bent. If I may so, that is exactly why my former 
colleagues Justices Mill and Wright went so awry.  
One theorist who seems to have grasped this is the prolific scholar, Cass 
Sunstein. He recognises that the retreat to philosophy will not resolve much. 
As tort law shows, there are almost as many philosophical theories on offer 
as there are theorists. So, instead of withdrawing to some lofty aerie of pure 
philosophy, he recommends that progress can be made if we settle for a 
more modest climb and occupy a ledge on which those who disagree at a 
greater height can nonetheless find sufficient commonality closer to the 
ground. Not surprisingly, this innovation has appealed to common law 
judges and jurists. These ‘incompletely theorized agreements’ can afford a 
temporary relief, but their lasting appeal is more elusive.  They tend, if I may 
mix my metaphors, to fall in that uncomfortable spot between an abstract 
rock and a practical hard place. It only works when there is already ample 
uniformity and conformity between the philosophical high-fliers; there is no 
real space for genuine conflict in this middle-of-the-road ideology. It is a 
band-aid that does little to heal the real source of conflict.   
In the face of these salutary truths, it would seem that judges have little 
choice but to go on doing what they have always done – trek from one case 
to another in the hope that they will stumble upon some temporary nostrum 
that will get them out of the doctrinal binds that they so often find 
themselves in. And the fact is that this might be the best that we can do. If 
we look for greater consistency or coherence, we will be forever condemned 
to the hellish fate of other disappointed or frustrated absolutists. Somewhat 
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perversely, I now realise that, for all my criticisms of the judicial process and 
my premature retirement from it, there is no other mode of practice that can 
do much better than the common law format.  
Rather than see the common law as a fixed body of rules and regulations, it 
is preferable to view it as a living tradition of dispute-resolution. Because law 
is a social practice and society is in a constant state of agitated movement, 
the common law is always an organic and hands-on practice that is never the 
complete or finished article; it is always situated inside and within, not 
outside and beyond, the society in which it arises. In short, the common law 
is or should be a work-in-progress -- evanescent, dynamic, messy, 
productive, tantalizing and bottom-up.  The common law is always moving, 
but never arriving, is always on the road to somewhere, but never getting 
anywhere in particular, and is rarely more than the sum of its parts and often 
much less. And judges play the role of its itinerant travelers-cum-guides. But 
– and this is a very large ‘but’ – this is not to be taken as a complete or 
uncritical vindication of the status quo. Much less is it a recantation of my 
earlier criticisms. Far from it. If we are to make good on this depiction of 
the common law, we must appoint men and women who understand this 
and who bring to it a wealth of not only legal experience, but also social 
sensitivity and political insight. [The great judge is not someone who knows 
more about law than anyone else. Not only do we need judges who are 
humble and honourable, but also those who are committed to advancing a 
set of values that are compatible with the best traditions of a truly human 
and humane society. A great judge should be acclaimed because of their 
values, not in spite of them.  The difficulty comes of course when we come 
to address what those values are and how they compete one with the other, 
or one set of values with another set. There is a powerful illustration of the 
irresolvable difficulties that competing moral and philosophical values pose 
for common law adjudication in the recent High Court of Australia litigation 
of Cattanch and Harriton, cases involving so-called ‘wrongful life’ actions 
Actions for wrongful life, as they have come unfortunately to be styled 
encompass various types of claim. These include claims for alleged 
negligence after conception, those based on negligent advice or diagnosis 
prior to conception concerning possible effects of treatment given to the 
child’s mother, contraception or sterilisation, or genetic disability. This 
distinguishes such claims from those for so called wrongful birth, which are 
claims by parents for the cost of raising either a healthy or a disabled child 
where the unplanned birth imposes costs on the parents as a result of clinical 
negligence. Two of the more controversial cases to have reached the High 
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Court in the past decade are Cattanach v Melchior where the Court, by a 
narrow majority (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ; Gleeson CJ, 
Hayne and Heydon dissenting) acknowledged recovery for wrongful birth. 
In the second joined appeals of Harriton v Stephens and Waller v James; 
Waller v Hoolahan the Court overwhelmingly precluded a ‘wrongful life’ 
claim (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ; 
Kirby J dissenting). Both cases raised issues around the sanctity and value of 
life and the nature of harm and the assessment of damages, Harriton and 
Waller both involve three questions. First, how is the loss in a ‘wrongful life’ 
case to be characterised? Is the ‘loss’ indeed properly regarded as ‘life’? 
Second, once that loss has been characterised, does legal principle or public 
policy permit recovery? Third, if principle or policy permit recovery, is that 
loss capable of being ascertained. Of course, these three questions are not 
considered in isolation from each other – for example, the characterisation 
of the loss and the views on public policy are obviously interlinked. In 
Harriton, Crennan J, giving the leading judgment, emphasises the need to 
preserve the coherence of legal principles ironically using aspects of policy to 
do so.   
In Cattanach, McHugh and Gummow JJ observed that the law should not 
shield the appellant doctor or hospital from ‘what otherwise is a head of 
damages recoverable in negligence under general and unchallenged 
principles’ for what was a breach of duty of care by Dr Cattanach. They 
argued that what was wrongful was not the birth of the child but the 
negligence of Dr Cattanach. Hence, as future expense was a reasonably 
foreseeable loss, albeit financial, it was recoverable. A similar view was also 
taken by Justice Kirby. Justice Hayne in dissent acknowledged that financial 
expenses associated with a child were reasonably foreseeable, but rejected 
any notion that this automatically entitled parents to recover, arguing that it 
was against public policy to encourage parents to assert that their child 
represented a net burden.  Justice Heydon also appealed to public policy 
considerations; child-rearing costs should not be recoverable as this would 
transform children into objects and create a ‘commodification’ of life. Chief-
Justice Gleeson appealed to international instruments protecting the rights 
of the child to support this same conclusion while Justice Heydon believed 
such ‘commodification’ would be contrary to human dignity.  
In a phrase that was later to be reflected on in Harriton and Waller at greater 
length, responding to the appellant’s argument that it was wrong to try to 
place a value on human life ‘because it is invaluable – incapable of effective 
or useful valuation’ - McHugh and Gummow replied that it would be wrong 
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– simple but wrong – to call upon values such as the importance of 
respecting human life to conclude that that should shield the appellants from 
the full consequences in law of Dr Cattanach’s negligence. Similarly, it was 
inappropriate to require set off of the benefits that the Melchior’s could be 
expected to enjoy from the birth and development of the child, as the 
financial damage directly consequent upon damage to the physical interests 
of Mrs Melchior were an unrelated head of damage. The Court had been 
urged to follow a distributive justice approach that requires a focus on the 
just distribution of burdens and losses among society, as held in the English 
House of Lords decision in McFarlane v Tayside Hospital Board. There 
Lord Steyn had argued that ‘tort law is a mosaic in which principles of 
corrective justice and distributive justice are interwoven and in situations of 
uncertainty and difficulty a choice has to be made between the two 
approaches.’ In Cattanach the High Court narrowly settled on the corrective 
justice approach, without recourse to subjective judicial notions of 
community conscience. The community conscience has spoken loudly since 
however, as, responding to political lobbying from the powerful medical 
professional organisations in Australia, each state jurisdiction has passed 
legislation reversing the effect of the High Court’s decision. 
Harriton and the conjoined case of Waller involved claims for so-called 
‘wrongful life,’ previously derided in a leading English case as entailing the 
conclusion that ‘to impose such a duty towards the child would, ... make a 
further inroad on the sanctity of human life which would be contrary to 
public policy.’  Alexis Harriton was born 25 years ago with severe physical 
and intellectual disabilities; she is blind, deaf, has mental retardation and 
physical disability. She is unable to care for herself and will require 
continuous care for the rest of her life. She argued that all this could have 
been avoided or averted if her mother, who had rubella during the first 
trimester of pregnancy, had been properly advised, which it was accepted 
that she was not, thus allowing her lawfully to terminate the pregnancy. The 
doctor’s failure to order a second blood test on the appellant’s mother led 
him wrongly to advise that the illness with which she had been suffering had 
not been rubella.  
Keeden Waller (K), on the other hand, was born following his parents use of 
IVF. Mr Waller had a low sperm count and poor motility; examination 
disclosed that he also suffered from a blood disorder known as anti-
thrombin or Factor III deficiency, the effect of which is to raise the 
likelihood that blood will clot in the arteries and veins. It was agreed that 
had the Waller’s been told – which they were not – that the AT3 deficiency 
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was genetic they would have either deferred undergoing insemination until 
methods were available to ensure only unaffected embryos were transferred, 
or used donor sperm or terminated an affected pregnancy, such as K’s Soon 
after birth K was diagnosed as suffering from a cerebral thrombosis as a 
result of which he suffers permanent brain damage, cerebral palsy and 
uncontrolled seizures. He sued the IVF practitioner, the diagnostic service 
that analysed K’s father’s sperm and a specialist obstetrician to whom K’s 
mother was referred after embryo transfer for antenatal care arguing in each 
case that, but for the negligence of the defendants [comma here] he would 
not have been born suffering with disability. The High Court finally 
dismissed both claims and in each case both cases by a majority verdict 6 -1. 
Justice Crennan, in Harriton and Waller, wrote the leading judgment; Kirby J 
was the sole dissentient in both appeals. Crennan J (with whom Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow and Heydon J agreed in both cases) advised that the two main 
issues in H’s appeal were whether there was legally cognizable damage and 
secondly whether there was a relevant duty of care. Even if both these 
questions were answered affirmatively, she would have apparently denied the 
suit ‘if calculating damages according to the compensatory principles was 
virtually impossible ... .’  Crennan J observed that to superimpose a further 
duty of care on a doctor to a foetus (when born) to advise the mother so 
that she can terminate a pregnancy in the interest of the foetus in not being 
born, (which may or may not be compatible with the same doctor’s duty of 
care to the mother in respect of her interests), has the capacity to introduce 
conflict, even incoherence, into the body of relevant legal principle.  
Kirby J in contrast contended that what is involved is an “unremarkable” 
case of a medical practitioner’s duty to observe proper standards of care 
when the plaintiff was clearly within his contemplation as a fetus, in utero, of 
a patient seeking his advice and care. He cautioned against the use of the 
‘emotive slogan’ of ‘wrongful life’ and, as he sees it, the importation of 
‘contestable religious or moral postulates.’ The reality of the ‘wrongful life’ 
concept is such that a plaintiff both exists and suffers, due to the negligence 
of others.  A further disagreement coloured the approaches to the question: 
‘what is the damage in a ‘wrongful life’ suit’? According to Hayne J the 
relevant question, and problem, is that in order for the appellant’s life to be 
viewed as an “injury” or “harm”, ‘it is logically necessary to compare her life 
with another person’ and not, as she had contended with not having been 
born at all. ‘It is because the appellant cannot ever have had and could never 
have had a life free from the disabilities that she has that the particular and 
individual comparison required by the law’s conception of “damage” cannot 
be made.’ Crennan J suggests that the appellant’s argument that her life with 
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disabilities is actionable clashes with arguments about the value (or sanctity) 
of human life and evoke ‘repugnance.’ It is ‘odious and repugnant’ to 
devalue the life of a disabled person by suggesting that such a person would 
have been better off not to have been born into a life with disabilities But 
this is to mischaracterise the debate. The plaintiff in a wrongful life action 
does not maintain that his or her existence is wrongful. Nor does the 
plaintiff contend that his or her life should be terminated. Rather, the 
“wrong” alleged is the negligence of the defendant that has directly resulted 
in the present suffering.  
This much seems to be at the heart of the acknowledgement by McHugh 
and Gummow in Cattanach that what was wrongful was not the birth of the 
child but the negligence of Dr Cattanach. As alternatively expressed in 
Waller, ‘“wrongful life” actions do not literally involve the complaint that life 
per se is wrongful. As in everyday personal injury actions, the complaint 
rather is that particular suffering and loss caused by the tortfeasor is legally 
wrongful.  As Tony Weir has nicely expressed it; to damage is not always to 
make worse in the law of tort; ‘… it can consist of not making things better 
when there was a duty to do so.’  The fact that the doctor did not cause the 
rubella damage does not mean that he did not cause the plaintiff to suffer 
under the rubella damage. What is ‘wrongful’ is not the life but the life of 
foreseeable suffering in the event of breach of a duty of care. This is not a 
wrong with no name; it is a wrong with the wrong name. 
The legal action is a limited exercise constructed only in order to attempt to 
recover damages to support the life that is now being lived, one which, as 
described, involves total dependence and continuing care, a life of suffering. 
This case is, evidently, as with many torts cases, about other and wider issues 
than the presenting issue; it is about who cares, literally and metaphorically, 
for Alexia Harriton. ‘It is hard to see, as Justice Kirby puts it, how an award 
of damages to a severely handicapped or suffering child would ‘disavow’ the 
value of life or in any way suggest that  the child is not entitled to the full 
measure of legal and nonlegal rights and privileges accorded to all members 
of society. The hope expressed in the majority judgments is that that will be 
done by or provided for by the state, rather than the insurance company 
standing behind Dr Stephens. Yet daily, we read of the general reluctance of 
all publics to pay for state of the art treatment and care for those who really 
need it; in terms of health care dollars, we want more and more for less and 
less. In everyday life there are those who live – literally and metaphorically – 
on the edges of existence. In this world, the Alexia Harriton’s of our 
societies are likely to be towards the back of a very long queue.  That is not, 
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of course, the same as saying that they should be at the head of it. But the 
metaphysical argument that the High Court constructs and then eschews 
(life v non existence) are no more than a convenient screen deflecting away 
from the core issue; should an admittedly negligent insured doctor’s insurers 
be asked to absorb the costs of the long term consequences of the 
negligence, or should that be left either to general taxation or the private and 
philanthropic interest of the appellant’s family and friends?   
In Waller Crennan J (with whom Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ 
again agreed) averred that the plaintiff alleged that the defendants caused or 
materially caused his life with disabilities, flowing from the implantation of 
the embryo ‘which became him,’ by failing to investigate and advise his 
parents that the AT3 deficiency was liable to be transmitted to offspring. It 
was agreed that such advice would have enabled the parents to make lawful 
decisions about starting or continuing the pregnancy which would have 
resulted in K not being born. According to Crennan J the claims involved an 
assertion that it would have been better if he had not been born, 
‘irrespective of whether the conduct about which he complains occurred 
prior to, or during, his mother’s pregnancy with him.’ That this is not legally 
cognisable damage, was held in Harriton. Justice Hayne (concurring) said 
that there was no relevant damage and Callinan J added that Waller (like 
Harriton) ‘cannot be heard as a matter of logic, to say that he “should never 
have been brought into existence”, in which event he would not have been 
able to say anything at all.’  
Again Justice Kirby was straightforward in his explication of the relevant 
law:  ‘the established duty of care which health care providers owe to the 
unborn in respect of pre-natal injuries requires the exercise of reasonable 
care in investigating risks of disability that might afflict prospective children 
and warning those in relevant relationships with the provider of such risks.’  
K was ‘unquestionably foreseeable’ and vulnerable to the consequences of 
the defendant’s negligence. The first and second respondent ‘enjoyed special 
control’ over the circumstances that occasioned the damage caused. And 
none of the public policy arguments ‘furnishes a convincing reason for 
refusing to provide relief for which ordinary negligence doctrine would 
otherwise provide.’  The strongest argument against recognising a duty or 
imposing liability if it were breached, Kirby acknowledged, is that comparing 
existence with non-existence is an impossible exercise because it would 
involve unknowables or immeasurables, incommensurables as it were.  But 
as Kirby objects in both Harriton and Waller ‘these cases demonstrate that 
this is not so.’  
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From Cattanach, Harriton and Waller we learn that while birth is not always 
a blessing for those caring for the born, life is always a boon for the person 
living it, irrespective of the cost or burden of that life to or on others. There 
is something in these cases – especially Waller and Harriton – that discloses 
much about the nature of common law adjudication, and, incidentally, of 
modern medicine.   In applying what he calls the ordinary principles of the 
law of negligence to Waller, Kirby J comes closest to an appreciation that 
IVF and its associated genetic technologies are part of an industry – a very 
particular and special industry to be sure – that operates on commercial 
lines. And that industry is heavily backed by insurance and services for 
which consumers are willing to pay. For some, that might in itself be 
thought to be a cognisable moral objection to the practices of IVF and 
genetics; that increasingly it looks like the child is being treated in some way 
as a commodity (not just as a means to another’s ends in the Kantian 
formulation – at least no more than any child may be when conceived)  IVF 
may itself be a part – a large part – of the commodification of the child, but 
a child who is no less loved and valued by its parents when it is a member of 
their family. In other words the commodification or commercialisation of 
part of the process of conception does not deleteriously affect the child after 
its birth. In the same way in the ‘wrongful life’ cases, the reality of a case 
such as this is that the wrongful life action like that of wrongful birth ‘are 
about money rather than love or family feelings.’  And, the High Court has 
held, there is no ground for believing that upholding a claim for damages 
following the birth of a healthy but originally unwanted child is likely to do 
any more to commodify that child as a matter of law rather than 
unwarranted social sentiment (or values) that the Court was not prepared to 
admit to the bar.  Strange then, that it does precisely that in Harriton and 
Waller, relying on the emotional linguistic appeal of the notion of wrongful 
‘life’ rather than as Kirby suggests the less negatively valued - laden (but not 
value free) notion of ‘wrongful suffering.’ In the first case the damages are 
awarded for the unlooked for expense of damage flowing directly from the 
physical harm to the mother in the unwanted pregnancy and childbirth, a 
fact virtually indistinguishable from the real harm in Harriton.  
The changing catalogue of the doctrine of sanctity of life in the library of the 
common law, holds now that it should be shelved below other valuable 
principles, notably autonomy and in some libraries human dignity. This 
fundamental shift is a steady and growing if sometimes reluctant acceptance 
that life may be sometimes more of a burden than a benefit.  This has found 
notable judicial expression in the past two decades in cases such as those 
involving the dying of patients in persistent vegetative state, of the 
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withholding or withdrawal of treatment from severely disabled adults and 
neonates and from the terminally ill, and of the judicial authorisation of 
operations when the known or sometimes intended result is that one person 
will die, as in the sanction of operations on conjoined twins. These legal 
confrontations of the endings of life, notably in England & Wales in the case 
of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (1993), are almost paradigm cases of the 
incommensurability of values.  Each evidences a radical rethinking of the 
doctrine of the sanctity of life in modern law, and is one of the most 
significant shifts in the common law for centuries, if not, arguably, ever.  
Whatever its rhetoric, however, the common law has never in fact been 
umbilically joined to the sanctity of life doctrine. The tort law system itself is 
one of regulating risk; certain activities entail risks that may be outweighed 
by the benefits resulting from them to the community as a whole. ‘It is no 
less plausible to assert that rather than treating life as sacrosanct, the courts 
are inexorably involved in a system which cheapens life by exposing some 
lives to threat for comparatively trivial rewards for other people.’ As Guido 
Calabresi has taught, the law of torts entails choices in everyday life. Cases at 
the edges of existence are sometimes thought to demand as much judicial 
precision as achievable in the controversy at bar, yet they disclose some of 
the fundamental values at stake in a legal system. It is unsatisfactory, then, to 
approach these cases as an exercise in misreading based on mislabelling.  
So, in closing, I thank you for presenting me with this opportunity to share 
these few thoughts with you. In particular, I offer my apology for not having 
conveyed to you a more enlightening and compelling set of insights. 
However, I see little that gives me any great optimism that the next twenty-
five years will be much different than the previous twenty-five years. As the 
English causation cases of Hotson, and others, show, the judges still put 
abstract principle above social justice – it is a sad and wasteful process.  
Hotson tells us much that we need to know about the common law: 
principle is prioritised, but there is no escape from politics; indeed the 
invocation of principle impedes social progress and serves sectional 
interests.  We will continue to make our way through the fog that rolls in 
from the shores of the future. At a minimum, it is our judicial duty to ensure 
that we do not add to that murkiness with intellectual smog of our own 
making. 
I ended my judgment in Derek with a few words from John Donne. I will 
close now, if I may, with the more daunting words of James Fitzjames 
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Stephen. The tone is more gloomy and downbeat, but no less compelling for 
that: 
"We stand on a mountain pass in the midst of whirling snow and blinding 
mist, through which we get glimpses now and then of paths which may be 
deceptive. If we stand still, we shall be frozen to death. If we take the wrong 
road, we shall be dashed to pieces. We do not certainly know whether there 
is any right one. What must we do? 'Be strong and of a good courage.' Act 
for the best, hope for the best, and take what comes. Above all, let us dream 
no dreams, and tell no lies, but go our way, wherever it may lead, with our 
eyes open and our heads erect."   
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